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Nuclear Security Governance for the 21st Century:
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Kenneth N. Luongo
Partnership for Global Security
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SEOUL
The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Seoul, South Korea, will raise the international 
profile of the threat of nuclear terrorism and focus attention on the need to better secure weapons-usable 
nuclear materials in all corners of the globe. It follows the first NSS held in March 2010 in Washington, 
DC. Another summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014. This sequencing of biennial, high-level 
international political summits has underscored the global importance of addressing the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. As a result, the NSS has the potential to become the preeminent international forum where the 
state of global nuclear material security is evaluated and where new commitments are made to improve 
the world’s defenses against nuclear terrorism. But, to fully realize its potential, the NSS process will need 
to evolve and participating countries must be willing to accept changes that will strengthen the nuclear 
material security regime. 
It is important to recognize that regularized, high-level, international summits that address important 
transnational issues are fairly rare, difficult to establish, and raise expectations for effective action. The 
closest corollary is the G-8 economic summit process, and the recent addition of the G-20 economic 
summits. But even the G-7 meetings (the forerunner of the G-8) were not regularly established until 
1979. And their creation was an outgrowth of the ad hoc sessions initiated by the industrialized countries 
following the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. 
The NSS process has had the foresight to address the clear and dramatic danger posed by nuclear 
terrorism in advance of any such shocking event. But this strategy of focusing attention on the prevention 
of nuclear terrorism requires policies and requirements to be stronger than those that the Washington 
Summit, and likely the Seoul Summit, will require. It requires the development of an international nuclear 
security regime that emphasizes transparency of action, shared standards, and confirmed performance and 
accountability by nations.
The upcoming meeting should build on the success of the first NSS by moving beyond the current 
elements of the regime and creating the foundation for the construction of an improved governance 
structure for nuclear security—one that is comprehensive, standardized, and accountable. If this policy 
evolution process can be initiated at the Seoul Summit and can be continued in subsequent summits, it 
would help significantly strengthen and expand the existing nuclear and radiological material security 
regime. 
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THE NEED FOR IMPROVED GOVERNANCE
The 2010 Washington Summit solidified and underscored the key elements of the current nuclear material 
security regime, including the importance of strong national control and regulation, acceptance of United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and international agreements, and the continuing role of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the summit documents did not require countries 
to take any specific action beyond those that they wanted to take. The most specific actions toward 
nuclear material security improvements—many important—were declared unilaterally by individual 
nations in attendance. But, the summit Communiqué and Work Plan only outlined specific actions and 
policy objectives without making implementation mandatory.1
This may have been an acceptable outcome in 2010 at an inaugural summit. But circumstances have 
changed over the past two years, particularly as a result of the nuclear reactor accident at Fukushima in 
Japan. While for many nations, including some of those in attendance in Washington, nuclear terrorism 
remains an abstract and distant threat, Fukushima underscored that nuclear disasters can occur in an 
extremely technologically advanced country, as a result of an unanticipated event, and have significant 
economic and social consequences. In addition, the accident at Fukushima made it clear that the global 
community does not have an adequate system in place to deal with nuclear crises that extend beyond 
borders.
In fact, in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident a number of high-level international discussions 
were held, including at the IAEA and the United Nations (UN). As a result of a conference on nuclear 
safety and security held in September 2011, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, declared, “The 
effects of nuclear accidents respect no borders. To adequately safeguard our people, we must have strong 
international consensus and action.”
The current nuclear material security regime has improved over the past ten years but it still lags 
behind other regimes including safeguards, safety, and arms control. At the very least, all of these other 
regimes require some element of transparency and/or verification of commitments. The current nuclear 
security regime is still very much designed and controlled by national agencies and actors and remains 
individualized to specific nations. International obligations are largely voluntary with no uniformity of 
security regulations or procedures. These are major gaps in the regime in comparison to other, related 
nuclear issues.
What is needed is a confidence building architecture that emphasizes demonstrated performance and 
accountability. It must be comprehensive and include clear but flexible standards.2
THE CURRENT NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME
The current nuclear material security regime is composed of three major elements. The first is the 
domestic laws and regulations that govern security on a nation’s territory. The second is the international 
agreements and institutions and United Nations Resolutions that supplement domestic security laws. The 
third is ad hoc, cooperative measures in which nations voluntarily agree to participate.
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Domestic Activities
The first line of defense for the security of nuclear materials resides with the country that manufactured 
or stores them. These materials are national possessions, and the laws and regulations of individual 
nations are the most relevant protections. This is one reason why the Washington Summit made clear that 
each nation possessing nuclear materials has a duty to ensure the highest level of protection. Individual 
nations are very protective of this sovereign control, and it is a major reason why that summit did 
not seek to break new ground by introducing new initiatives. The rationale was that security could be 
significantly improved if all nations took additional steps at home and also adhered to the international 
conventions and agreements that have been developed over the past 65 years. The 2010 NSS work plan 
does encourage the sharing of best security practices, in cooperation with industry, the IAEA, and newly 
created nuclear security training centers to develop effective, robust nuclear security systems and culture, 
but it does not identify a path forward for this cooperation. 
International Conventions, Agreements, and Institutions
There are a handful of major international agreements and conventions that govern nuclear material 
security, though there are also others that have applicability to terrorist activities using weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) more directly. 3 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendment
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) is the only legally binding 
international document on the physical protection of nuclear materials. The convention requires its parties 
to take appropriate measures to protect civilian nuclear materials while in transit. The CPPNM also 
criminalizes the theft, misuse, or threat of misuse of nuclear materials and requires each state to designate 
a point of contact for information if material is stolen or diverted. The CPPNM was signed in March 1980 
and entered into force in 1987.4 As of September 2010, there were 145 parties to the CPPNM.5
Because the original CPPNM only applied to the transport of nuclear materials, an amendment was 
agreed upon in July 2005 to expand its physical protection regime. The 2005 Amendment requires 
countries to protect domestic nuclear facilities and materials in use, in storage, and during transport. It 
also strengthens provisions to protect against theft, diversion, or sabotage, and provides for expanded 
cooperation to rapidly respond to these offenses. The 2005 Amendment, however, has not yet taken 
effect because not enough nations have ratified it. Two-thirds of the state parties to the CPPNM must 
ratify the amendment before it can enter into force. As of December 2011, only 52 states have completed 
ratification.6 At the 2010 NSS, five states (Argentina, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) pledged to ratify the 2005 Amendment.7 To date, only Argentina, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom have followed through on that pledge. 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in April 2005 to ensure that states would have in place legal 
frameworks criminalizing the illicit possession or use of nuclear material or devices by non-state actors.8 
Under ICSANT, states must put in place domestic laws to investigate possible offenses as well as arrest, 
prosecute, or extradite offenders.9 Countries are also called upon to cooperate and share information on 
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nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, take measures to protect radioactive materials within 
their territories, and be instructed on how to proceed if an illicit device or material is recovered from non-
state actors. Unlike the CPPNM, ICSANT applies to civilian and military materials. At the 2010 NSS, 
Armenia, Argentina, Australia, Georgia, the United Kingdom, and the United States committed to moving 
toward the convention’s ratification.10 To date, Armenia, Georgia, and the United Kingdom have ratified 
the arrangement.11
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR): 1373, 1540, & 1887
In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the UNSC unanimously passed 
UNSCR 1373. Though it focused on general counterterrorism mechanisms and enforcement measures, 
it specifically cites “the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist 
groups” and “illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials.”12 Because 
the resolution was passed under the UNSC’s Chapter VII authority, action is not voluntary. It requires 
members to take measures to combat terrorism.
Despite its mandate for action, the resolution has loopholes, and its shortcomings were highlighted by 
the discovery of an international nuclear proliferation network run by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. 
To supplement the resolution, the UNSC unanimously passed UNSCR 1540 (also under Chapter VII) 
in April 2004.13 This resolution was primarily aimed at preventing WMD terrorism by non-state actors 
and for the first time bound UN member states to take and enforce measures against WMD proliferation. 
These included creating and implementing strict national export controls and security over all sensitive 
materials as well as prohibiting financial or other assistance to non-state actors seeking WMD or related 
materials. It also requires nations to submit reports on their efforts, though the actual reporting has been 
very uneven. 
In September 2009, US President Barack Obama chaired a session of the UNSC, during which UNSCR 
1887 was unanimously adopted. UNSCR 1887 reaffirmed the threat of nuclear proliferation to global 
security and the need for multilateral actions to prevent it.14 The resolution highlighted the need for 
improving the security of nuclear materials to prevent nuclear terrorism and expressed support for the 
April 2010 NSS, the goal announced at that meeting of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around 
the world within four years, minimizing the civil use of HEU, and multilateral initiatives such as the G-8 
Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA has several key roles to play in supporting effective nuclear material security. The Agency’s 
activities in this area are separate and distinct from the roles that it plays in ensuring nuclear material is 
safeguarded so that it cannot be transferred for weapons uses and in supporting nuclear safety. However, 
the IAEA is only allowed to encourage and incentivize states on nuclear security matters and has no 
mandate to evaluate state performance in applying or complying with its recommendations.
The most developed set of recommendations and guidance that the IAEA offers on the physical protection 
of nuclear materials and facilities can be found in Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225/Revision 5.15 
State authorities are encouraged to apply the IAEA’s recommendations to nuclear materials in use, transit, 
and storage to minimize the possibilities of unauthorized material removals and sabotage. The fifth 
revision of INFCIRC 225 was released in early 2011. It addresses the post-9/11 threat environment and 
includes guidance to help countries comply with obligations under the amended CPPNM and UNSCR 
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1540. The previous revisions were completed in 1999. The most recent revision updates categorizations 
of nuclear material and clarifies site access and control areas. Other changes involve new licensing 
requirements, prevention of sabotage, interface with safety, interface with material accounting and control 
systems, and response to malicious acts. 
The IAEA also has an Office of Nuclear Security with several responsibilities. It plays the leading role in 
planning, implementing, and evaluating the agency’s nuclear security activities, including those carried 
out under the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013.16
The plan focuses on protection, detection and response, and information coordination and analysis. A 
second role is producing Nuclear Security Guidelines documents, 15 of which have been published to 
date.17 Third, the office is responsible for the management and expenditure of the Nuclear Security Fund,18 
which is used to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. This fund is largely reliant upon extra-
budgetary contributions from member states, though it does receive some small funding from the regular 
IAEA budget.
In addition to the documents that the IAEA produces, member-states can augment their domestic security 
protections by seeking in-country assistance. The IAEA’s nuclear security advisory services include: 
International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions which help identify a country’s 
broad nuclear security requirements and measures for meeting them; International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions which evaluate a country’s existing physical protection arrangements; 
and IAEA State Systems for Accountancy and Control Advisory Services (ISSAS) which provides 
recommendations for improving a country’s nuclear material accountancy and control systems.19
Ad Hoc, Cooperative, and Nongovernmental Activities
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and concerns about “loose nukes,” the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime in the 1990s expanded from consisting primarily of arms control treaties to also include new, non-
treaty based (ad-hoc) initiatives. The first of these initiatives was developed between the United States 
and Russia, but other multilateral initiatives were then developed as well.
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Related US Programs
One of the most important developments was the creation of US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program by Congress in 1991.20 CTR was designed to address the potential leakage of WMD from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. CTR and related programs focus on protecting and eliminating nuclear, 
chemical, and biological stockpiles; securing nuclear weapons-usable materials; and eliminating delivery 
systems. The core of the nuclear material security initiatives is run by the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous arm of the Department of Energy. In recent years, programs 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have also begun contributing to these efforts, 
including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) which is charged with creating a global 
nuclear detection architecture.
Historically, most of the nuclear material security funds have been spent in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). However, programs are slowly trending toward more global targets. In 2004, NNSA 
created the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Nuclear Materials Protection 
and Control (INMPC) program that work with other countries outside the FSU to assist with material 
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security. However, a 2009 National Academy of Sciences report suggested that the overall effort needs to 
be updated from “CTR 1.0” to “CTR 2.0,”21 and the programs must evolve to be more agile, flexible, and 
globally responsive while retaining their cooperative, results-focused core. 
By concentrating on joint problem solving and cooperative approaches to mitigating dangers, CTR has 
achieved nuclear material security improvements that would not have been possible otherwise, validating 
the importance of ad hoc approaches.
G-8 Global Partnership 
The G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global 
Partnership) was established in 2002 as a multilateral corollary to the CTR effort. G-8 countries pledged 
$20 billion over ten years to support this work.22 Under this agreement the United States would provide 
$10 billion with the rest of the G-8 countries contributing the remaining $10 billion. In practice, however, 
the US’ annual contribution to the Global Partnership is now approximately $1.5 billion, $500 million 
more than originally expected. Approximately $1 billion per year is spent in Russia and the former Soviet 
states with the rest directed to other regions of the world.23 While beginning as a G-8 initiative, the Global 
Partnership has grown to include 23 partners: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine (recipient only), United Kingdom, and 
United States.24 Most of the non-US funding supports nuclear safety work, submarine dismantlement, and 
chemical weapon destruction. 
In 2008, the Global Partnership’s geographical focus was expanded beyond Russia to allow the 
multilateral effort to operate anywhere in the world where terrorism and proliferation risks existed.25 But 
the G-8 nations have had difficulty managing the transition away from a focus on Russia, and the majority 
of the funds are still spent there. The Global Partnership was set to expire in 2012, but at the 2010 NSS, 
President Obama called for a 10-year extension, an expansion of its scope and mission, and another $10 
billion in funding for new projects.26 However, just weeks after the Washington Summit, in July, the G-8 
decided not to take action on the extension of the Global Partnership and instead to evaluate the program 
before deciding how to proceed.27 The next year, at the May 2011 G-8 Summit, leaders extended the 
Global Partnership, but did not include any new funding targets.28 They did elect to enlarge its scope of 
activities and expressed their objective of expanding the number of participants.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
In October 2006, Russia and the US created GICNT, a non-binding forum for sharing nonproliferation 
expertise and information as well as for preventing nuclear terrorism. In the four years since its creation, 
GICNT has grown from 13 to 82 member nations.29 There are also four official observers: the IAEA, 
European Union, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In 2009, members 
agreed to strengthen the group by promoting greater civil society and private sector involvement. GICNT 
has conducted over 30 multilateral activities and five senior-level meetings in support of the initiatives 
objectives.30 In President Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague, he called for GICNT to be transformed 
into a formal institution, though it has yet to move in that direction. However, at the 2010 and 2011 
Plenary sessions, GICNT took steps to strengthen its activities by adopting three priority function areas 
that will be led by member states: nuclear detection (Netherlands), nuclear forensics (Australia), and 
response and mitigation (Morocco).31 These issues have more to do with reaction to a nuclear terrorist 
event rather than the prevention of it.
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Proliferation Security Initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a US-led multilateral initiative that was launched in May 
2003 to interdict WMD and related materials in transit. PSI has grown from 11 participating states to 99 
(as of September 2010).32 Participating nations endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and 
participate in meetings, workshops, and other exercises to improve their capacities for breaking up black 
markets as well as for detecting and intercepting materials. PSI members rely on existing national and 
international legal authorities to impede WMD trafficking. In President Obama’s April 2009 speech in 
Prague, he called for PSI to be transformed into a formal institution, though no steps have yet been taken 
to do so.
World Institute for Nuclear Security
The Vienna-based World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)33 was launched in 2008 to provide an 
international forum for promoting the implementation of best practices by all those accountable for 
nuclear security, but with a particular focus on the nuclear industry. WINS publishes best practices guides 
(e.g., Nuclear Security Culture, Security Equipment Maintenance, and Security Governance) in multiple 
languages that are informed by the expertise of its members. It also regularly brings together experts 
from industry, government, and international organizations at workshops with the objective of helping to 
strengthen the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities around the world. 
CHALLENGES TO CURRENT REGIME EFFECTIVENESS
The list of the current elements of the nuclear material security regime is long, and in many ways 
impressive. The problem is that it is not comprehensive, cohesive, and current given the evolution of 
nuclear threats and challenges in the 21st century. That threat has gone through many evolutions from the 
superpower arms race, to rogue regimes, to loose nukes, to nuclear terrorism. Today, the threat is all of 
those issues as well as the expansion of fissile material stockpiles and nuclear reactors in volatile regions. 
While the response to most of the traditional threats has been fairly robust, such as the nonproliferation 
regime, arms control treaties, and nuclear suppliers guidelines, it is least developed on the loose nukes-
nuclear material security issue. This problem exists in large part because of the voluntary, sovereign, and 
non-transparent nature of the regime.
The Threat
The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy identified nuclear terrorism as 
the greatest and most urgent threat facing the United States.34 One reason is that Osama bin Laden had 
stated that he considers it to be a religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons, and there is some evidence 
that al-Qaeda has pursued such a capability.35 However, not all countries accept the priority of the danger 
posed by nuclear terrorism. Some consider it to be an obsession of developed nations and a problem 
primarily for the nuclear weapons states. But this is an incorrect reading of the danger. The larger amounts 
of nuclear material in weapons states may increase security vulnerabilities, but they also have the most 
developed security systems and guard forces. It is important to recognize that even small amounts of 
material in any country, if not adequately protected, are a danger. Some developing countries also see the 
10 |     KENNETH LUONGO
NUCLEAR SECURITY GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
intensified international political focus on nuclear material security and the NSS process as a potential 
means of impeding their access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and as a result remain 
skeptical.
The major concern about nuclear terrorism is the potential access of terrorists to fissile and high intensity 
radiological material. There is a very large stockpile of fissile material around the globe—rough estimates 
put it at 1,440 tons of HEU and 495 tons of plutonium.36 About half the world’s fissile material is in 
military stockpiles and the rest in civilian stockpiles. But the exact amount of this material is not known 
with any precision and the error on the estimates is +/- 125 tons for HEU and +/- 10 tons for plutonium.37 
There is particular concern about HEU because it is used in a number of applications outside of military 
programs, and a crude HEU gun-type device is considered to be the most accessible nuclear terrorist 
weapon.38 It is estimated that 50-60 kilograms of HEU would be needed to make a crude gun-type 
nuclear device.39 But, such a device would likely be large and heavy and terrorists would need some basic 
infrastructure support, such as a machining capability, to create it. 
A plutonium device is much harder to develop without a more sophisticated technical infrastructure and 
experts, and terrorists likely would need more assistance in building this type of a weapon.
The largest fissile material stockpiles are in the United States and Russia.40 But much also exists in 
Britain, France, China, and Japan. And the security for nuclear materials around the globe is uneven, 
particularly in the civilian sector. This security vulnerability becomes even more acute when the material 
and security problems are in dangerous neighborhoods of the world, where nations possessing the 
material do not have strong governance. For example, 10 tons of HEU is used in civilian applications in 
non-nuclear weapon states with the largest stockpiles in Belarus, Ukraine, and South Africa.41 
Nuclear smuggling is one window into the threat and it is a reality. According to the IAEA, there have 
been 1,600 cases of illicit nuclear trafficking since 1993.42 There have been 18 cases of the theft or loss 
of HEU or plutonium.43 None of the HEU that was recovered was reported missing from the facility 
from which it disappeared.44 There have also been at least three cases of holding radiological sources for 
ransom.45
In addition, two teams of armed men attacked a South African site that contained hundreds of kilograms 
of HEU.46 Terrorists have been seen on reconnaissance missions near a Russian nuclear weapon storage 
site.47 In January 2010, peace activists penetrated a Belgian air base where US nuclear weapons are 
believed to be stored.48And, in December 2011, Greenpeace activists infiltrated two separate French 
nuclear power plants on the same day.49 
Radiological terrorism is a related threat and is considered to be a higher probability event than a nuclear 
attack.50 But, the issue of high intensity radiological source security is inadequately prioritized in the 
nuclear material security regime. A radiological device can be created by wrapping an explosive around 
a radiological source and detonating it, though there are a variety of other methods that can be used. 
Radiological devices do not result in nuclear explosions, but do spread toxic radioactive materials. A 
radiological attack is much less sophisticated and would cause much less physical damage than a nuclear 
attack, but its impact on the global economy would be significant depending on the location.51 There is a 
serious problem with the security of radiological sources around the world. The IAEA estimates that there 
are 100,000 to 1 million radiological sources around the globe, but no country has a completely accurate 
accounting.52 
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Nuclear Expansion
Compounding the danger posed by the existing stockpiles of fissile materials is the anticipated growth 
of nuclear facilities and power around the globe—but in particular in historically unstable regions. This 
expansion cannot be ignored and needs to be addressed in a clear and creative way. The growth of nuclear 
power is a global reality and the regime for protecting these materials and facilities needs to evolve 
with this reality. The accident at Fukushima, in addition to highlighting the global impact of an accident 
at a nuclear power plant, has distorted the once clear line between nuclear safety and nuclear security. 
Although the accident was caused by nature, the radiation release and the way in which the reactors were 
affected were indistinguishable from an act of terrorism.
Nuclear Power Growth
Today, there are 433 nuclear reactors in operation around the world and the IAEA projects that an 
additional 90 will come online by 2030.53 The Fukushima accident is expected to potentially slow nuclear 
power growth, but not stop it. 54 One area of significant growth is expected to be in countries that already 
have operating nuclear plants, particularly in the Far East.55 The IAEA’s low projection estimates nuclear 
power capacity to grow from 81 GWe in 2010 to 180 GWe by 2030 in this region, with its high growth 
model predicting upwards of 255 GWe. 
In January 2012, China was generating 1.8 percent of its electricity from 15 nuclear reactors.56 An 
additional 26 reactors are currently under construction out of a total of 51 that are planned. Japan typically 
generates 29.2 percent of its electricity from more than 50 nuclear reactors.57 Two of 10 planned reactors 
have been under construction, but Japan’s nuclear future is being reconsidered in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima accident in March 2010. Currently, only two of its reactors are in service.58 In the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), 32.2 percent of its electricity is generated by 21 reactors.59 At the start of 2012, five of six 
planned reactors were under construction. 
The ROK wants to become one of the world’s top three nuclear reactor exporters by 2030 through 
securing $400 billion worth of nuclear energy-related contracts and exporting 80 reactors. In 2009, 67 
percent of South Korea’s plant building deals were in the Middle East.60 
The Middle East is a region with very little nuclear infrastructure but potentially significant future growth 
in nuclear power. At least half a dozen nations are contemplating nuclear reactor construction with several 
already moving forward. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has completed a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the United States, and the US is in the process of negotiating similar agreements with 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In December 2009, South Korea secured a contract to supply the UAE with 
four light water reactors (LWR) by 2030. South Korea also won a contract to supply Jordan with its first 
5 MW nuclear research reactor in December 2009.61 Jordan has signed Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOU) with more than 10 countries in preparation for purchasing its first nuclear power reactor that it 
wants to be operational by 2020. Iran’s Bushehr (915 MWe) reactor became operational in May 2011, 
was connected to the grid in September 2011, and began commercial operation in January 2012.62 Turkey 
is also interested in building nuclear power reactors, and the ROK has offered to build them.63 An MOU 
was signed by Turkey and the ROK in June 2010. In May 2008, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the US and Turkey entered force.
The expansion of nuclear infrastructure and materials in historically volatile regions like the Middle 
East in an age of radical terrorism heightens the need to construct higher and more robust protective 
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barriers. This will require governments to think more creatively about the evolution of the governance 
structures for nuclear safety and security. But, it also requires the nuclear energy industry to accept more 
responsibility for the protection of its products. In this regard, a significant portion of the nuclear energy 
industry has taken an important voluntary step in accepting the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles 
of Conduct. This is a common set of guidelines that major nuclear exporters have agreed to apply when 
considering sales of reactors and other technologies. The principles create common standards of practice 
including committing suppliers to ensure that purchasers of nuclear technologies have adequate security 
procedures in place.64
Fissile Material Production
While the protection of nuclear infrastructure is an important objective, the most obvious path to the 
creation of a terrorist improvised nuclear device (IND) is through the acquisition of fissile material. Most 
of the NSS process has focused on preventing this scenario by encouraging improved protection of these 
materials, the consolidation and down-blending of excess materials, and the conversion of civil reactors 
that use HEU to non-weapons-grade fuel. Also, while virtually all the declared weapons states have 
ended their production of fissile materials for weapons, HEU and plutonium production for both civil and 
military purposes continues in some key countries and some volatile regions, particularly South Asia.
Pakistan and India are the only states still known to be producing HEU. India’s HEU stockpile is 
estimated to be 2 tons (+/- 0.8 tons). It is intended for the country’s submarine propulsion program and 
thought only to be enriched to 30-45 percent. India’s enrichment capacity has been rapidly expanding in 
recent years, including new generations of centrifuges and (possible) expansion of its current enrichment 
site. India’s second enrichment complex, the Special Materials Enrichment Facility, is being planned and 
will not be safeguarded to keep “options open for using it for multiple roles.”65
Pakistan’s HEU stockpile is estimated to be 2.75 tons (+/- 1 ton). It is intended for the country’s nuclear 
weapons program and enriched to 90 percent. Uncertainty surrounds Pakistan’s enrichment capacity, 
including the operating history at Kahuta and the possible existence of centrifuges at Gadwal.66
India, Pakistan, and possibly Israel, also are the only countries that continue to produce plutonium for 
weapons. India’s stockpile of plutonium is estimated to be 0.52 tons (+/- 0.17 tons). Weapons plutonium 
was originally produced in India’s CIRUS (40 MWt) and Dhruva (100 MWt) reactors in Mumbai, but 
CIRUS was shut down in December 2010. A new “multipurpose high flux reactor” similar to the Dhruva 
reactor is being planned for operation in 2017-2018 to replace CIRUS.67 
Pakistan’s plutonium stockpile is estimated to be 135 kg (+/- 45 kg) and its plutonium production capacity 
is expanding. Khushab-I (40-50 MWt) has been operating since 1998; a Khushab-II began operation 
around the end of 2009/beginning of 2010; and a third reactor site is nearly complete. Satellite images 
indicate a fourth plutonium production reactor is also being built. All reactors are estimated to be of 
similar size.68 
Certainly the challenges of adequately protecting today’s global fissile material stockpile are going to be 
further compounded by the continued production of these materials in India and Pakistan, and perhaps 
in other nations, including Iran and North Korea. This raises questions about the adequacy of the current 
regime and whether it is sufficiently adaptable to these evolving circumstances as well as adequately 
effective in the face of new challenges.
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Inadequate Cohesion and Transparency
The nuclear material security regime lacks cohesion and focus because many of its elements were 
developed in response to crises or opportunity, not as part of a rational regime development process. 
For example, a number of the ad hoc programs were originally designed to deal with Russia and the 
former Soviet states, but are now being adapted for more global missions. The UNSCRs and new IAEA 
initiatives were a reaction to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. However, in the current global political and 
economic environment, there is not much appetite for dramatically remaking the current regime and 
creating new institutions. But, the elements of the regime should be carefully analyzed and rationalized so 
that overlaps, duplications, and inefficiencies can be eliminated. Then the gaps can be filled. 
The most significant challenge to improving nuclear material security worldwide is that the security of 
nuclear materials is not uniform across borders. Moreover, security systems are not transparent, creating 
real and perceived vulnerabilities about the security of nuclear materials in each nation.69 This does not 
mean that every nation has to do exactly the same thing. Each state has its own internal and cultural 
considerations, and this will inevitably lead to differences in implementation. But, the voluntary and 
sovereign nature of the regime means that there is no forcing mechanism to move all nations toward 
a common set of objectives and practices. Lack of transparency means that the security situation in 
suspected weak link countries can only be improved if that nation decides it wants assistance with its 
security. But, this is an inadequate approach when the cross-border implications of a nuclear material theft 
or use of an RDD or IND are significant and not adequately accounted for in the current regime.
In general, the security of military-related fissile materials will always remain highly sensitive and little 
transparency should be expected soon. But, gradual transparency and trust building is possible with 
political will. The United States, Russia, and former Soviet states have proven for over 15 years that 
fissile material security can be a subject of discussion among former adversaries if there is sufficient 
will and adequate protections for confidentiality. Significant improvements in nuclear security in these 
countries have been made as a result of this collaboration. 
The international community needs to define for the future a cohesive security architecture based on the 
concept of confirmed performance and to generate international expert and political support for it in order 
to persuade governments (some will be quite reluctant) to accept a new global order for nuclear material 
security.
ACTION PLAN FOR EVOLVING NUCLEAR SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Moving the nuclear materials security regime beyond its current envelope will not be an easy task, and 
is likely to engender opposition and obstruction from a number of countries and experts. But, the current 
system is too fragmented, too ineffective, and not well suited for future challenges. 
The NSS process, which is a short term effort to coalesce key nations around the priority of protecting 
nuclear materials, has focused on generating greater global adherence and implementation of key 
international conventions and legal instruments. These include the CPPNM and its amendment and the 
UNSCRs. This is an important objective and contributes to the creation of a stronger foundation for 
regime improvements, but these agreements represent the status quo, not the innovation in governance 
that is required. 
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The NSS process has also helped to generate growth in the supporting infrastructure for nuclear security 
through the creation of new centers of excellence.70 At the Washington Summit, Japan, China, India, and 
South Korea pledged to create these centers. The European Union (EU) has also launched a Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Center of Excellence Initiative to help countries and 
regions maintain the institutional capacity needed to fight these threats.71 It aims to establish centers of 
excellence in five regions of concern: South Caucasus/Ukraine/South East Europe, North Africa, West 
Africa, the Middle East, and South East Asia.72 Japan opened its center of excellence in December 2010, 
India launched its center with a regional training course in November 2011, and the EU established a 
Secretariat for the Middle East center in Amman, Jordan in December 2011. China has signed an MOU to 
cooperate with the US and is constructing a new facility. The South Korean center is scheduled to open in 
2013. This infrastructure development will make use of the capabilities of the IAEA, which is attempting 
to coordinate among them, and that of WINS as well as individual nations.
The role of these centers is envisioned to be as repositories and disseminators of nuclear material security 
best practices. But they also can become advocates for improvements in the governance structure 
and actually work on some of the key questions that need to be addressed, including how to facilitate 
transparency to generate international confidence without revealing sensitive information, to better secure 
high intensity radiological sources, and to improve the independence of regulatory authorities. Moreover, 
there are lessons that can be learned about securing sensitive materials and at highly classified facilities 
while ensuring confidentiality from the original center—the Russian Methodological and Training Center 
(RMTC) located in Obninsk, Russia, which was formed as a joint project with the United States.
While the NSS process has taken the important step of establishing global fissile material security as a 
top-level international objective, this mission will require actions beyond the current mechanisms and 
international consensus. The question remains what will happen to the momentum for improvement of 
the global regime if this process were to end after the next meeting in 2014. There needs to be a more 
permanent, cohesive and comprehensive international instrument that will harmonize and supplement 
the existing regime. The objective should be to create a more robust, effective, and flexible 21st century 
nuclear material security architecture to effectively protect fissile and radiological materials.
A Framework Agreement
A Nuclear Material Security Framework Agreement is one approach that could address this challenge. It 
would identify threats from vulnerable nuclear materials, especially those posed by terrorists, and list the 
actions required to mitigate them. A framework agreement would allow the subject to be acknowledged 
at a very high political level as a global priority and then require the adherents to take specific steps to 
achieve its objectives either in the text or through subsequent protocols.73 
The framework could include a number of items and usefully package them so that its norms are unified, 
clear, and cohesive. For example, it could:
•	 Include a comprehensive and convincing assessment of the nuclear terrorist threat, including the 
global economic consequences of a nuclear or radiological terrorist event. It must be clear that 
security systems have to evolve to meet the changing threats.
•	 Recognize all the relevant existing conventions, agreements, and UNSCRs, and state that 
universal acceptance of these agreements and their rigorous implementation are fundamental for 
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effective and sustainable nuclear security.74 
•	 Recognize the importance of the IAEA in the area of nuclear and radiological security, and 
request greater international political and financial support for its activities.
•	 Clearly establish the legitimacy of ad hoc mechanisms such as the CTR program, the G-8 
Global Partnership, and the GICNT while proposing that these initiatives be streamlined and 
folded together, where appropriate, to increase efficiency. It could encourage all nations that can 
contribute to the objective of these efforts, or benefit from them, to become participants.
•	 Make clear the need for continued, robust, multilateral funding over the long term for those 
nations and institutions in need of assistance to improve nuclear material security, including 
through the IAEA, and to fulfill international obligations, such as UNSCR 1540.
•	 Recognize that the production and use of HEU for civil purposes should be limited and eventually 
eliminated, that excess fissile materials should be permanently disposed of, and that storage 
of all nuclear materials should be consolidated to the degree possible, consistent with safety 
requirements.
•	 In the near term, encourage implementation of the highest possible security standards through an 
intensive process of global best-practices and security culture engagement utilizing contributions 
from individual nations, the IAEA, WINS, and the centers of excellence, while underscoring the 
need for a better balance between voluntary and mandatory security commitments, standards, and 
practices. It could identify the eventual need for a baseline standard for nuclear and radiological 
material security to supplement the current voluntary requirements and guidelines. It also could 
underscore the need for some form of measurable and transparent implementation of security 
measures without compromising sensitive information. 
•	 Encourage public-private partnerships in support of nuclear security and recognize the important 
role that the nuclear industry and civil society play in this area. 
•	 Allow for the negotiation of supplementary protocols that require more detailed actions. The 
protocols could specify actions to be taken by individual nations, identify standards for security 
through the creation of a scientific council, detail means of sharing information for peer review on 
a confidential basis, identify dates for completion of specific security actions and improvements, 
and establish enhanced authority for the IAEA.75 It also should include an amendment process 
and a regularized review conference.
•	 Include an annex with individual national commitments that will be undertaken to improve 
nuclear material security, similar to the “house gifts” provided at the Washington Summit, but 
with the ability to continually supplement the list, rather than waiting every two years.
This agreement should eventually be universal, but its development could begin with support from a 
coalition of committed nations. However, its legitimacy would be strengthened if it had political support 
in the developing as well as in the developed world.
General Principles for the 21st Century
The policy objectives of the framework agreement should also be supplemented with clear principles 
that frame the development of the new agreement and its architecture. These principles could include 
recognition that:76
16 |     KENNETH LUONGO
NUCLEAR SECURITY GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
•	 Nuclear power and technology are vital energy and human resources and the benefits of nuclear 
power, medicine, and other peaceful uses of atomic energy must be protected.
•	 Nuclear safety and security should be continuously reviewed and improved on a national and 
international basis.
•	 All necessary steps to prevent nuclear terrorism using fissile materials and high intensity 
radiological sources should be taken by all nations possessing them.
•	 All necessary steps should be taken to prevent the unauthorized, non-remedial release of radiation 
from nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities by all nations possessing them.
•	 The stakeholder communities—governments, regulators, industry, international organizations, 
and civil society—should be treated equally in ensuring the safety and security of nuclear 
facilities and materials.
•	 Nuclear safety and security are interrelated endeavors and all elements of these regimes should be 
reviewed and improved on a regular basis on both the national and international levels.
•	 Any improvement in the nuclear material security regime will have to balance the principles of 
sovereignty with international responsibilities and obligations.
•	 The governance system should embrace a culture of confirmed performance.
Framework Agreement Precedents
Framework agreements addressing transnational challenges, like nuclear material security, have 
precedent, particularly in the environmental area. Legally, framework agreements are designed to unify a 
“special regime” that consists of elements that are binding but fragmentary. They also give international 
obligations a rooting in international law.77 Models for the framework agreement on nuclear material 
security include the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).
Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol78
 In 1977, due to a growing consensus in the scientific community on the harm chlorofluorocarbon gases 
(CFCs) were causing to the ozone layer, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) concluded the 
World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. This plan called for international research and monitoring of 
the ozone layer.
In 1981, UNEP’s Governing Council authorized the body to draft a global framework convention on 
stratospheric ozone protection. In March 1985, UNEP opened the resulting Vienna Convention for 
signature. This is a framework agreement under which states agree to cooperate on research and scientific 
assessments, exchange information, and adopt “appropriate measures” to prevent activities that harm the 
ozone layer. All obligations are general and contain no specific actions or limits on chemicals. It did not 
include any implementing protocols. In addition, the convention was not universal. It was initially ratified 
by a smaller number of nations than have signed it today.
This approach broke with previous practice. Earlier UNEP regional seas agreements had established 
the precedent of negotiating a framework convention together with at least one protocol that contained 
binding obligations. States were required to ratify at least one binding protocol when they joined a 
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framework convention. While negotiators of the Vienna Convention discussed adding a protocol that 
would give specific targets for certain chemicals, they could not reach consensus and so the framework 
convention was negotiated without binding protocols.
A UNEP working group began working on a binding protocol to the Vienna Convention in December 
1986. Their work resulted in the Montreal Protocol, which was concluded in September 1987 and went 
into effect on January 1, 1989. Like the Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol was not accepted 
initially by all nations and its membership grew over time.
Ozone agreements were the first to address a long term transnational problem in which the damage 
caused in the short term might not be evident for decades. This approach requires flexibility and adaptable 
agreements capable of accommodating new realities over time. Indeed, special provisions were included 
in the Montreal Protocol for this purpose. 
For example, Technology and Economic Assessment Panels were created to provide regularized expert 
assessments. An adjustment process was developed to create targets and timetables for phasing out 
chemicals listed in the protocol. And, an amendment process allowed new chemicals to be added to the 
list of controlled substances. The parties to the convention must ratify any new amendment to be bound 
by it. New countries that join the Protocol are bound by all amendments made to it as of that date, but 
they must individually ratify any future amendments. There have been four amendments to the Protocol: 
London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Montreal (1997), and Beijing (1999). 
An Implementation Committee also was created to facilitate compliance with the protocol. It reviews 
annual reports submitted by countries and has a suite of measures to help address issues of noncompliance 
and implementation assistance. This precedent has been used in a number of subsequent environmental 
agreements, including: the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC; the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its Protocols; and the UNECE 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol formula also has been applied to the UNFCCC agreement 
that was followed by the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity with its Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. The Montreal Protocol’s formula of targets and timetables has been subsequently 
employed in international agreements controlling air pollution and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The UNFCCC also includes a high-level international scientific advisory panel, the Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice, which could serve as a model for a similar group supporting the nuclear 
material security framework.79 The mandate of this body is to provide advice on scientific and technical 
issues that are relevant to the substance of the convention. While the climate change convention limits 
participants on the panel to governmental representatives, the nuclear material security version could 
include nongovernmental and private sector experts who could provide alternative perspectives.
There are several interesting aspects of the mandate of the climate change scientific panel that could 
be relevant in the nuclear framework. For example, it allows the panel of scientific experts to assess 
the effectiveness of measures taken to implement the convention and respond to technical questions 
that parties may put to it. While that may not be an unusual charge, it also requires experts to identify 
innovative and state of the art technologies that can be utilized as well as ways of promoting and 
18 |     KENNETH LUONGO
NUCLEAR SECURITY GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
transferring them to other nations. In addition, it provides a mandate for promoting international research 
and development cooperation and supporting capacity building in developing countries.80 
All of these activities conducted by the climate change scientific panel could be directly relevant to the 
nuclear material security area and it is a mandate that fits very well with the proposed best practices 
and centers of excellence concepts. It also could perform the assessments of the more technologically 
adventurous ideas such as the baseline standard and the means of protecting, while sharing, sensitive 
information.
No other elements of the existing security regime require this type of expert body or international 
scientific scrutiny. In fact, there are multiple sources of technical expertise that are provided by 
governments, national laboratories, the IAEA, and nongovernmental and private sector experts. But, 
a scientific advisory body would not need to be imbued with overriding authority. It could be used to 
harness the technical talent that already exists around the globe.
Nuclear Safety Convention81
The nuclear safety regime has significantly improved over time in response to the accidents at Three 
Mile Island and Chernobyl. The challenge for the nuclear security regime is to prevent an event and not 
act forcefully only after a terrorist attack has occurred. There are four major elements embodied in the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety  that have been critical to the improvement of nuclear safety over time—
regularized assessments, information sharing, peer review, and reviews of the implementation of relevant 
international conventions. 
Neither of the nuclear security regime’s key international conventions—the CPPNM and its amendment, 
nor ICSANT—includes provisions for assessment, information sharing, or peer review. A single CPPNM 
review conference was held in October 1992, five years after it entered into force as required by Article 
16, during which unanimous support for the CPPNM was expressed by the 35 states in attendance. 
CPPNM parties came together again in the late 1990s and early 2000s to strengthen and expand the scope 
of the convention by amending it to better address threats of nuclear terrorism, smuggling, and sabotage. 
Amendments were adopted in 2005, but will not come into effect until two-thirds of the state parties ratify 
the changes. The ICSANT has a provision for an amendment conference but not a review conference. 
Because the nuclear safety regime is so familiar to many in the nuclear business, and because it is 
considered to be more developed and robust than the nuclear materials security regime, it could offer a 
useful platform from which to begin the evolution of nuclear security governance.
ACTION PLAN (2012-2020)
The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit offers a very useful pivot point for a future focus on the 
evolution and improvement of the nuclear materials security regime for several reasons. First, there is 
broad understanding, as a result of Fukushima, about the transnational implications of an unauthorized 
release of radiation and the inability of the international system to adequately address these implications. 
Second, the Seoul Summit needs to build on the foundation created by the Washington Summit, offer 
something more creative than just the pursuit of the universality of adherence to the existing conventions, 
and create momentum for policy evolution leading up to the summit in the Netherlands—which could 
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be the last one. At the very least, the inclusion of several new issues on the Seoul agenda, including 
radiological security and the interface between nuclear safety and security, open up new avenues for 
initiatives and creative policy development. Third, the experts’ symposium that will be held in Seoul 
before the summit has as its theme, “Innovating Nuclear Security Governance,” that can be carried 
forward to the next summit, and even beyond. It is a theme that the South Koreans can own and nurture 
because no other nation has claimed the issue.
The approach to building a modernized governance regime should be careful and deliberate so as not 
to raise suspicions about hidden agendas or ulterior motives. It should also include a nongovernmental 
track that can supplement governmental action, or more likely precede it by identifying paths forward and 
strategies that governments can then consider.
The two-track approach can include formal negotiations on binding requirements (a long term effort) and 
an expert-academic process to identify binding and voluntary measures beyond current requirements.
The expert process should be led by an independent group of professional and knowledgeable individuals 
from a cross section of countries. They should be committed to the evolution of nuclear governance, have 
the professional experience that allows their opinion to carry weight in the global community, and be 
creative in their thinking.
The formal negotiation approach does not need to be universal but can utilize the Vienna Convention and 
even the NSS precedent of selective multilateralism. For example it could begin with discussions among 
CPPNM members.82
The process should be broken down into two phases that culminate in 2020. The first phase should be 
interim goals for 2012 through 2016. And the second phase should be from 2017 through 2020.
In the first phase, the official process should:
•	 Continue the NSS process with meetings every 2 or 3 years.
•	 Seek near universal ascension and implementation of the key international conventions (CPPNM 
and amendment and ICSANT).
•	 Seek agreement by a selective and committed group of nations that improvement in nuclear 
security governance and relevant regimes is necessary, including: 1) the creation of a working 
group to develop and review new proposals; and 2) the initiation of a review of the overlap 
among existing nuclear material security regime elements and recommendations for the best path 
forward for streamlining them.
•	 Initiate limited steps toward the implementation of key elements of the safety regime in the 
nuclear security area. For example, this might entail encouraging interaction among regulators 
from different nations; facilitating discussion among nuclear operators on security issues while 
protecting sensitive information; and increasing cooperation and information sharing between key 
stakeholder groups, such as through some regularized meeting process.
•	 Take steps to ensure that the new centers of excellence are developed and effective with minimal 
duplication.
•	 Assist with the strengthening of WINS and related industry-focused organizations.
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During this phase, the expert process should:
•	 Create an independent Global Nuclear Governance Experts Group that can assess the current 
state of nuclear security governance and make recommendations for changes and improvements. 
The group should be geographically diverse and cross disciplinary as well as selected for 
its commitment to creative solutions to the current challenges. The development of these 
recommendations is completely consistent with statements that have been made by the UN 
Secretary General, the IAEA, and the NSS. 
•	 Continue outreach to governments, international organizations, and industry to find consensus 
on the mix of binding and voluntary measures for nuclear security that builds upon the current 
system.
•	 Develop the draft text of a new Framework Agreement for Nuclear Security based on either or 
both, a UNSCR 1887-like resolution that could include a check list of the actions a nation must 
take in order to be considered a good global nuclear material security citizen and/or global goals 
similar to those outlined in the Vienna Convention and UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.
•	 Submit the draft framework agreement to the NSS nations for review and response.
•	 Begin to work on implementation protocols to the framework convention.
In the longer term through 2020, the objectives should be to establish a new nuclear governance 
performance-based architecture that:
•	 Confirms the importance of national responsibility and recognizes the need for protection of 
people and the environment outside of national borders in the event of a crisis, accident, or 
terrorist event.
•	 Calls for regularized information sharing and international peer reviews of security practices and 
performance, with confidentiality provisions.
•	 Better integrates operators, regulators, governments, international organizations, and civil society 
as well as identifies their responsibilities.
•	 Mandates international nuclear security standards that reflect a minimum performance criteria that 
is comprehensive, effective, succinct, and clear.
•	 Establishes effective response and communication methods in the event of a crisis, accident, or 
terrorist event.
•	 Establishes long term technical, bureaucratic, and financial support for the new system.
•	 Results in the approval of the new Framework Agreement for Nuclear Security.
•	 Provides the IAEA with the responsibility for helping all nations meet the new governance 
requirements.
CONCLUSION
The NSS process has created a new and unique channel for the improvement of nuclear material security 
and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. It has created a very important, high level political process 
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that did not exist before. It offers the opportunity for making progress on a scale that otherwise would 
not exist and would have had to be done country-by-country. But, the consensus-based approach of the 
process is not well suited to the development of dynamic new policies, the policy objectives are not 
binding on any nation, and the national commitments are completely voluntary. 
As a result, additional steps beyond what the NSS likely can deliver, and in support of the continued 
improvement in the security regime if the summits are ended, are required to build a stronger 
security regime for this new century. The Washington Summit was an important watershed event; it 
both highlighted the importance of universalizing the current regime commitments, improving the 
infrastructure around the regime, and generating national commitments to take action. The decision 
to extend the summit process to South Korea and now the Netherlands creates the opportunity to 
significantly build on this foundation by pivoting and beginning to focus on more forward-looking policy 
options that reflect new and changing threats and requirements. 
The upcoming summit and its corollary events, including the expert symposium that will focus on 
innovating nuclear security governance, provide a window of opportunity to begin to reframe the nuclear 
material security debate and develop new strategies and policies. 
Most important among these objectives should be the development of a Nuclear Material Security 
Framework Convention and subsequent actionable protocols. The precedents of the Vienna Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC and its protocols have made clear that this approach 
is neither radical nor uncommon. The nuclear material security regime is at present fragmented and 
incomplete. A framework convention can unify it and fill the policy voids. It can begin by taking 
advantage of the elements that exist in the nuclear safety regime—including regular assessments, 
information exchange while protecting confidentiality, transparency to generate international confidence, 
and limited peer review—since most specialists are familiar with this regime and because it has been 
operational and effective for many years.
In addition, the stakeholder community engaged in the details of nuclear materials security—
governments, international organizations, facility owners and operators, regulators, and international 
experts—needs to work more closely together to improve the governance structure. This process can 
move along dual tracks and the objective should be to deliver concrete progress at the 2014 NSS.
South Korea is an important choice for the second summit because of its unique position in the nuclear 
spectrum. It is a significant domestic consumer of nuclear energy, a rising exporter of nuclear technology 
(especially in the volatile Middle East), and a non-nuclear weapons state with a nuclear armed neighbor 
on its border. These circumstances provide the ROK with both the opportunity and the imperative to seize 
international leadership in improving the security of nuclear and radiological materials. It should use the 
Seoul Summit as the opportunity to launch an initiative to build a regime for nuclear security governance 
that meets the realities of the 21st century.
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